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Abstract 
Chinese rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) are a major supplier of credit to the rural 
sector in the country. However, Chinese RCCs are currently encountering operating 
problems, and an experimental reform is being carried out to restructure and reform the 
RCCs. In order to have some idea about the efficacy of reform, it is important to have an 
understanding of the institutional economics underlying the delivery of rural credit in 
China. This paper evaluates pure technical efficiency, overall technical efficiency, and 
scale efficiencies for RCCs in China using nonparametric techniques. The use of a 
bootstrap algorithm is proposed to perform inference for efficiency measures.  
 
Keywords: bootstrapping, Chinese rural credit cooperatives, data envelopment analysis, 
scale efficiency, technical efficiency. 
  
TECHNICAL AND SCALE EFFICIENCIES FOR CHINESE RURAL 
CREDIT COOPERATIVES: A BOOTSTRAPPING APPROACH IN DATA 
ENVELOPE ANALYSIS MODELS 
Introduction 
Like many developing countries, small enterprises and farmers in China suffer from 
a lack of access to capital. It is difficult for them to get credit from banks. In China, there 
are over 800 million rural inhabitants who engage in farming, forestry, fishery, and hus-
bandry; and there are over 20 million township and village enterprises (TVEs), which 
account for about 30 percent of gross domestic product and play an important part in the 
growth of the national economy. Although there are many commercial banks in China, 
most of them do not operate in the below-county-level areas because of operational cost, 
high financial risk, and low return. Since 1998, the four state banks (Agriculture Bank, 
Bank of China, Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank) have with-
drawn or merged 10,728 branches in five provinces, and most of these branches are in 
rural areas (Mu 2003). Moreover, the decision-making power of the four state banks’ 
branches that are at or below the county level to grant credit is reduced. The rural sector 
is supposed to be served mainly by a state bank (Agricultural Bank of China) (which is 
reducing its countryside branches), a policy bank (Agricultural Development Bank of 
China), and thousands of rural credit cooperatives (RCCs). However, Agricultural Bank’s 
support to agriculture has been decreasing since its allocation of resources expanded to 
cities and industries in the mid-1990s. Subsequently, its agricultural loans decreased from 
98 percent before the mid-1980s to a current 10 percent of total loans (Han n.d.), and 
RCCs are now the main force for serving peasants and TVEs. By the end of June 2003, 
there were 34,909 RCCs with 628,000 employees located at the township level, and 
RCCs had 2.2 trillion yuan of deposits and 1.6 trillion yuan of loans, which accounted for 
about 12 percent of total deposits and 11 percent of total loans by all financial organiza-
tions in China, respectively. In sharp contrast, RCCs had 696.6 billion yuan of 
2 / Dong and Featherstone 
 
agricultural loans, which accounted for about 84 percent of total agricultural loans from 
all financial organizations (Mu 2003).  
Since their initiation in the early 1950s to combat usury, RCCs had been the core of 
the rural financial system and played an important role in mobilizing rural household sav-
ings, channeling a significant share into loans made to TVEs, and funneling capital to 
agricultural and other development projects in rural areas. The RCCs in China are not “co-
operative” financial institutions by nature. According to a definition of the International 
Labor Organization in 1994, a cooperative is a voluntarily organized and democratically 
managed organization. The “Management Rules of Rural Credit Cooperatives in China in 
1997” defines the credit cooperative as an organization in which members could voluntar-
ily buy shares, implement democratic management, and share risks and benefits. However, 
China’s RCCs have never met those standards. The members, who join mostly under ad-
ministrative forces, have never managed business organizations and have no freedom to 
withdraw membership (Xie 2001). Before 1996, RCCs were managed by the Agricultural 
Bank of China and only afterwards were they restructured as a separate set of independent 
institutions. However, the RCCs are still partly under the control of the local governments, 
which tend to increase the supply of capital to agricultural production with little attention to 
institutional sustainability. In addition, because of low economic returns to most farmers 
and TVEs, the fragile agricultural economy, a narrow range of products, and bad credit or 
ethical risks of some borrowers, RCCs’ operational risk is very high. Because of the control 
and interference of local governments and local branches of the state banks, an abundance 
of “crony capitalism” (i.e., implied and overt connections between regulation and corrup-
tion, both bureaucratic and political), high financial risks as well as problems in self-
operation and management, poor service, and low quality of employees, the RCCs have a 
severe problem with non-performing loans. By the end of 1996, the non-performing loans 
amounted to about 238 billion yuan, accounting for 38 percent of the total loans.1 In addi-
tion, 53 percent of the RCCs had a deficit (Zuo 2001). Accordingly, the People’s Bank of 
China, the central bank, reported that the RCCs had a combined negative net worth.  
With severe problems in RCCs, which are currently the major financial institutions 
providing capital to farmers, farmers cannot obtain necessary capital and they have to use 
people-to-people private loans. As shown in Figure 1, between 1995 and 1999, people-to- 
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FIGURE 1. Sources of farmers’ loans, 1995–1999 
 
people loans accounted for about 70 percent of farmers’ total loans (Wen 2001). Over 40 
percent of farmers’ total loans are needed for production, as illustrated in Figure 2. Com-
pared to the 1980s, when most loans came from the Agricultural Bank of China and 
RCCs, and compared to the period between 1990 and 1994, when 40 percent of loans 
came from the Agricultural Bank of China and RCCs, farmers’ loans from financial insti-
tutions decreased to below 25 percent between 1995 and 1999 (Wen 2001). Given 
limitations and potential problems existing in people-to-people loans, such as their small 
scale, higher interest rate or usury, and disputation, people-to-people loans cannot effec-
tively satisfy farmers’ capital requirements. Scarcity of agricultural capital is restricting 
China’s agricultural development (Han 2003). Therefore, improvement in RCCs’ capac-
ity for channeling capital into agriculture is of crucial importance.  
Consequently, RCCs are experiencing reform and reconstruction. The first reform was 
introduced following the separation of RCCs from the Agricultural Bank of China. This 
reform introduced a microloan scheme supported by agricultural lending from the People’s 
Bank of China. Although this reform improved access by rural households to RCC loans, 
some other problems were incurred, such as having more microloans and consequently  
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FIGURE 2. Purposes of farmers’ loans, 1995–1999 
 
greater financial losses (Xie 2003). In August 2003, the State Council of China issued 
an instrument for experimental reform of RCCs. The experimental reform will be car-
ried out in seven provinces, Zhejiang, Shandong, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Jilin, Shaanxi, and 
Jiangsu, and one city, Chongqing, in 2004 (Jiangsu has been undertaking reform since it 
was chosen as the experimental province in 2000 and will continuously deepen its re-
form). The reform and reconstruction focus on two issues. One is to reform the 
structure of and clarify RCCs’ ownership or property rights. Given different conditions 
and development levels of areas RCCs reside in, there are three choices for the organi-
zation patterns of RCCs: the first is to reconstruct RCCs as shareholding financial 
institutions such as commercial banks or cooperative banks; the second is to combine 
RCCs and county credit unions as a united entity instead of separate legal entities; and 
the third is to keep the current structure in which each RCC or county credit union is an 
independent legal entity and to improve the cooperative system. In addition, RCCs with 
high risk or debt or that reside in urban or suburban areas and provide little service to 
agriculture can be merged, restructured, or even revoked. The second critical issue is 
the reform of the RCCs’ management system. RCCs will be moved under the admini-
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stration of provincial governments, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
will supervise their operation.   
To restructure and reform RCCs, it is necessary to understand their technical and 
scale efficiencies. Greater degrees of efficiency among RCCs could result in greater 
accessibility of loan funds, higher profitability, increased services for farmers, and 
greater probability for long-term viability by using savings-generated efficiencies  
(Ellinger 1994). Efficiencies in China’s RCCs may not exist for several reasons. First, 
under the management and intervention of state banks and local governments, along 
with abundance of “crony capitalism,” the RCCs’ performance is undermined. More-
over, because of political and social concerns, bankruptcy or other market mechanisms 
for improved performance do not exist. Second, poor means and technology of ser-
vices, low professional skill levels of employees, and redundant personnel increase the 
operational costs and decrease efficiencies. There were over 620,000 employees work-
ing for the RCCs, with average per capita assets of 21,900 yuan and average per capita 
costs as high as 42,000 yuan in 1999 (Xie 2001). In addition, the Chinese economy is 
characterized by high savings, inefficient financial intermediaries, and underutilization 
of economic resources (Fang 2001). RCCs, as one microsector of the financial econ-
omy, are unable to avoid such problems. If the RCCs become more efficient, then 
improved profitability, greater amounts of intermediated funds, and better service 
quality for rural customers are expected.  
Given the problems experienced by RCCs and increased pressures on RCCs’ reform 
and reconstruction, surprisingly, to the authors’ knowledge, no empirical research on ef-
ficiencies of China’s RCCs has been undertaken. In contrast, a large number of studies on 
efficiency of financial institutions, especially in the United States, have been undertaken. 
For example, Berger and Humphrey (1997) list 122 frontier studies that apply to effi-
ciency analysis of depository financial institutions. Among those listed, studies on U.S. 
financial institutions accounted for 66 of the 116 single-country studies.  
To fill this gap, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the technical and scale effi-
ciency and the nature of returns to scale (i.e., increasing, constant, or decreasing 
returns) in China’s RCCs. In addition, in order to determine the statistical precision of 
the estimated efficiency scores, we construct confidence intervals for the efficiency 
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scores produced by the linear programming approach by using bootstrapping tech-
niques. Viewed in this context, the empirical results presented in this paper provide 
extremely important insights into efficiencies in RCCs in China and the basis for re-
search on restructuring of RCCs and relevant regulations. The precise nature of 
efficiency scores in RCCs is extremely important, both from an academic and policy 
perspective.   
In the remaining sections we introduce the methodology used in this study, discuss 
data issues, analyze the empirical results, and summarize our findings.  
 
Methodology 
Nonparametric Method 
Empirical studies have used either duality theory with the estimation of cost func-
tions or nonparametric estimation methods to evaluate efficiency in the financial 
services industry (Featherstone and Moss 1994). The parametric method can capture 
and isolate statistical noise present in the data. However, the need to impose an as-
sumed functional form for the underlying technology and an assumed distribution for 
the inefficiency term make the parametric method less flexible. The nonparametric 
method seems attractive without imposing a specific functional form for the technol-
ogy as well as the distributional assumption for the inefficiency term. The 
nonparametric method is often referred to as data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA 
involves the utilization of mathematical programming techniques to construct a best-
performance benchmark from the observed data on inputs and outputs. The constructed 
relative efficiency frontiers are non-statistical or non-parametric in the sense that they 
are constructed through the envelopment of the decision-making units (DMUs), with 
the best-performance DMUs forming the frontier. Within this methodological frame-
work, the overall technical efficiency is decomposed into pure technical and scale 
efficiencies, a method initially suggested by Farrell (1957) and later extended by 
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984), and Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985). Empiri-
cal applications of the decomposition of overall technical efficiency to banking include 
but are not limited to those by Rangan et al. (1988), Aly et al. (1990), and Drake and 
Hall (2003). 
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Pure technical efficiency is a measurement of how far off a DMU is from the produc-
tion frontier. It indicates the potential reduction in inputs a DMU can achieve by adopting 
the best production and/or management practices of the best-performance DMU. Scale 
efficiency indicates whether the DMU is producing at the most efficient size. It measures 
the proportional reduction in input usage that is achieved if the DMU is operating at con-
stant returns to scale. Overall technical efficiency is the combined effects from both pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency.  
A DMU’s efficiency is a relative measure. It compares a DMU’s performance to the 
best performance implicit in the observed input-output combinations. Measuring per-
formance against best practice, DMUs can identify and then improve their less-efficient 
practices. When there are many DMUs each producing multiple outputs from multiple 
inputs included in a DEA analysis, the benchmark of a DMU will be made up of more 
than one DMU unless the DMU has the best performance in producing all outputs. A 
DMU will not usually have the best performance in producing all outputs and conse-
quently the best-performance benchmark of a DMU may include a number of DMUs that 
have the best performance in producing one or more outputs. 
Subsequent to the analysis is the mathematical linear programming approach for es-
timating technical and scale efficiency. Consider the situation with k firms or DMUs, 
each producing m outputs Y(=[Y1,…, Yk]) by using n inputs X(=[X1, … , Xk]), where Yi 
(i=1, … , k) is the (m%1) vector of outputs and Xi is the (n%1) vector of inputs. The input 
requirement set, or reference technology, can then be represented by the free disposal 
convex hull of the observations. The smallest convex set contains the observations with 
the least input requirement set for the certain level of outputs. For each DMU, i, pure 
technical efficiency, is calculated by solving the problem of finding the lowest multiplier 
λi, which must be applied to the use of inputs by i to ensure it is still a member of the ref-
erence technology. The pure technical efficiency is obtained by solving the following 
DEA model: 
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where z is an intensity vector and each zi (i=1, …, k) is positive; xij (i=1, …, n; j=1, …, k) 
is the ith input used by the jth DMU; and yij (i=1, …, m; j=1, …, k) is the ith output pro-
duced by the jth DMU. The symbol λi (i=1, …, k) is the measure of pure technical 
efficiency for the ith DMU. To determine overall technical efficiency (labeled θi), the 
DEA model in equation (1) is solved without the constraint that the sum of zi is 1, imply-
ing that the input set is convex and the technology is variable returns to scale (VRS). The 
measure of scale efficiency (Si) is the ratio of overall technical efficiency and pure tech-
nical efficiency (θi/ λi). If Si is equal to 1, then the DMU is scale efficient; if Si is less than 
1, then the DMU is inefficient. To determine the source of scale inefficiency when Si ≠ 1, 
the DEA model in equation (1) needs to be estimated by replacing the constraint that the 
sum of zi is 1 with the constraint that the sum of zi is less than or equal to 1; that is, the 
technology is non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS). Then if the objective function of the 
DEA model under NIRS (labeled γi) is equal to pure technical efficiency (λi), decreasing 
returns to scale exist; otherwise, increasing returns to scale exist (Färe, Grosskopf, and 
Lovell 1985, p. 184).  
RCCs allocate resources and control internal processes by managing their resources, 
facilities, and employees. RCCs that do this best are best performers and are on the effi-
cient frontier. RCCs can employ the DEA results to benchmark their processes and find 
potential areas for improvement. 
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Bootstrapping 
DEA methods have been widely applied, as described earlier. Yet most researchers 
have ignored the sampling noise in the resulting efficiency estimators. Typical DEA ap-
plications have no or only slight measurement and discussion of uncertainty surrounding 
efficiency estimates. The results assume that any deviation from the frontier production 
function is attributable to technical inefficiency. However, uncertainty is present in the 
DEA methods through sampling variability or the uncertainty arising from the estimation 
of the frontier. The ignorance of these statistical properties and uncertainty can lead to 
biased DEA estimates of efficiency and consequently to misleading conclusions.  
Because of the complexity of DEA estimators, in the general multi-output and multi-
input case, bootstrapping is currently the only way to investigate sampling properties of 
DEA estimators and to calculate confidence intervals (Simar and Wilson 1998). Boot-
strapping is based on the idea that if the data are viewed as a set of random draws from an 
underlying population, random draws from the sample are also random draws from the 
same population. How well the data-generating process (DGP) characterizes the true data 
generation and how well the DGP is mimicked in the resampling simulation directly af-
fect the performance of the bootstrap in terms of the validity of the conducted statistical 
inference (Löthgren and Tambour 1999). Assumptions on the DGP comprise the statisti-
cal model. Simar and Wilson propose the bootstrap for DEA with the assumption that the 
distribution of efficiency scores is independently distributed.  
Subsequent developments have extended the bootstrapping approach. In DGP, the 
efficiency scores calculated from the original data are used to form pseudo data. The effi-
ciency measures are input-based measures, so consequently only the inputs are adjusted 
in the formation of pseudo data and all original output levels are kept in the pseudo data 
set. Each pseudo data set is similar to the original data set in the sense that both follow 
the same distributions of inefficiency, and this assures that the levels of performance pre-
sented by the bootstrapping results are within the realm of observed behavior. If a large 
number of (say, B) pseudo data sets are formed, relative to each resulting pseudo refer-
ence technology, the efficiency scores can be calculated and the empirical distribution for 
the efficiency measures can be constructed from the B efficiency scores. It is worth not-
ing that the standard bootstrap may only be applicable in cases in which the statistics of 
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interest are smooth functions of the data. To overcome the shortcoming of the inconsis-
tency of naïve bootstraps when applied to DEA, Simar and Wilson propose the use of a 
smoothed bootstrap as a resampling method for DEA. By using a smoothing method, 
which centers on the kernel density estimator, a consistent estimator with the boundary 
condition on efficiency scores (less than or equal to 1) can be obtained. In constructing 
the density estimator, the choice of kernel function is rarely crucial and is minor in im-
portance compared with the problem of choosing the bandwidth (Greene 2003, pp. 453–
56). Given this reason and considering the complexity of calculating the bandwidth, we 
choose a standard normal kernel density. Based on Simar and Wilson’s methodology, the 
algorithm for the bootstrap of DEA efficiency scores is developed as follows: 
(i) Calculate the original DEA efficiency scores iθˆ ( i=1, …, k) under constant re-
turns to scale (CRS) for each observation by solving equation (1) without the 
constraint that the sum of zi is 1. 
(ii) Let **1 ,..., kββ  be a simple bootstrap sample from kθθ ˆ,...,1ˆ . Generate a random 
sample of size k from the following random generator: 
        otherwise         2
1 if              
{~ **
****
*
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iiii
i h
hh
εβ
εβεβθ −−
≤++=  
 where h is the bandwidth of a standard normal kernel density and *iε is a random 
deviate drawn from the standard normal. This generator takes into account the 
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 These are the smoothed bootstrap steps for generating the sequence of *iθ  
from iθˆ .  
(iv) Construct a bootstrap pseudo data set (Xi*, Yi*) which consists of the constructed 
pseudo input level iiii XX )/ˆ(
** θθ=  and the original input level Yi*=Yi. 
(v) Compute the bootstrap estimate *iˆθ  by taking the pseudo data as the reference 
set. In each bootstrap replication, also calculate pure technical efficiency meas-
ures λi and γi.  
(vi) Repeat steps (ii)-(v) 1,000 times. 
 
In step (ii), small values of h give smooth density estimates, which place too much 
weight near the upper bound 1; while large values of h provide oversmooth density esti-
mates with long tails at the left. By using Silverman’s rule of thumb, which maximizes 
the likelihood of a cross-validation function, an optimal value of 0.001483 is obtained for 
h (see Härdle and Linton 1994, p. 2304). The sequence *iθ in step (iii) obtained by the 
smoothed bootstrap has better properties than *iθ  in the sense that the variance of *iθ is 
asymptotically correct. In the bootstrap resampling, the pseudo input data are generated 
from resampled CRS efficiency measures as deviations off the CRS estimate of the input 
set instead of VRS or NIRS. This resampling approach guarantees that the DGP under the 
pseudo data generation mechanism is characterized by a scale-efficient technology 
(Löthgren and Tambour 1999). The number of bootstrap iterations is set at 1,000 to make 
the variability of the boundaries of the bootstrap confidence intervals acceptably low 
(Efron and Tibshirani 1993, p. 275).  
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As Kim and Schmidt (2000) point out, interval estimation of efficiency is often more 
appropriate from both an academic and policy perspective. The percentile method is used 
to construct confidence intervals. The percentile method would simply select the appro-
priate percentiles from the bootstrap distribution. For example, the 90 percent confidence 
interval for an estimate is constructed by ranking the bootstrapped estimates and then se-
lecting the 50th (5 percent of total iterations) outcome as the lower critical value and the 
950th (95 percent of total iterations) outcome as the upper critical value. Based on boot-
strap confidence intervals, we can do a hypothesis test on estimates. If the bootstrapped 
confidence interval for an estimate contains zero, then the null hypothesis that the esti-
mate is not significant from zero cannot be rejected; otherwise, the null hypothesis will 
be rejected. For a one-sided hypothesis test at the 90 percent confidence level, if the 
900th outcome (upper critical value) is less than one, then the null hypothesis that the es-
timate is equal to one will be rejected and we can conclude that the estimate is less than 
one at the 90 percent confidence level. 
 
Data 
RCCs’ business is much simpler than that of commercial banks. Since RCCs’ main 
business is borrowing from fund deposits and lending to others, deposits are treated as 
inputs and loans are treated as outputs (Chen 2001). The outputs for RCCs are capital 
loans to TVEs (township and village enterprises), fixed asset loans to TVEs, agricultural 
loans, other loans, and deposits to other banks. The outputs are based on the RCCs’ bal-
ance sheet of credit funds. Capital loans to TVEs are restricted to be used as operating 
cash, inventory, and short-term investment; and fixed asset loans are loans restricted to 
buying or constructing fixed assets. Agricultural loans are loans to rural communities or 
individual farmers that are used for buying machinery, fertilizer, or other production ma-
terials. Other loans refer to non-agriculture related loans not in the first three categories 
and include loans to industry or business. Different loans may have different interest rates 
set by the government to support some specific types of production during the study pe-
riod. The inputs for RCCs are specified as total fixed deposits, total current deposits, and 
employees. Total assets are mostly composed of loans having fixed assets typically ac-
counting for less than 2 percent. For this reason and because of data issues, fixed assets 
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were not included as an input. This is understandable when looking at the RCCs’ small 
operating space in rural China.  
Our analysis is based on province-level data. Although each RCC in China is an in-
dependent entity or accounting unit, because Chinese RCCs’ business establishments are 
based on administrative areas and are currently being reformed and reconstructed by 
provinces, the aggregated data at the provincial level fit the scenario. In fact, there are 
quite a few studies based on aggregated state- or national-level data. For example,  
Armah, Park, and Lovell (1999) use state-level data to measure the impact of state char-
acteristics as key determinants of bank efficiency; Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) 
use aggregated national commercial bank data to undertake simulations which suggest 
nationwide banking will lead to substantial consolidation of the banking industry; Wal-
lace (1994) uses state-level data to analyze structural and efficiency changes in financial 
performance across agricultural and nonagricultural banks; and Swamy et al. (1996) use 
state-level commercial bank data to investigate the determinants of U.S. commercial bank 
performance.  
The sample includes 29 out of 31 provinces and regions of mainland China (Figure 
3) in years ranging from 1991 to 1995.2 Since Chongqing became a central government-
administered municipality in 1997, it is included as a part of Sichuan province. Tibet is 
not included because data were unavailable. There are a total of 145 observations. The 
source of the data is the China Rural Finance Almanac (Agricultural Bank of China, 
various) for the respective years. The data is summarized in Table 1. 
 
Empirical Results 
The bootstrap results of pure technical efficiency for 29 provinces from 1991 to 1995 
with 1,000 iterations and 0.001483 as the bandwidth are shown in Table 2. The results 
listed include the medians and confidence intervals at a 90 percent confidence level. The 
medians are listed instead of the means because the medians provide a more robust meas-
ure of location than do the means when distributions are skewed as they are with DEA 
efficiency scores (Simar and Wilson 1998). Because of small variations in bootstrapping 
estimates that result from a good DGP and a small bandwidth, we apply the percentile  
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FIGURE 3. Map of China 
 
method instead of the complicated bias-corrected percentile acceleration interval intro-
duced by Efron (1987).  
Using the percentile method, we can conclude that 16 out of 29 provinces or cities, 
namely Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, 
Henan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, were 
technically efficient in every year.3 This indicates that the RCCs in those provinces or 
cities adopted virtually the same practices. They were operating on the relative produc-
tion frontier. In the meantime, Jiangxi and Hubei were technically inefficient in the first 
four years while Fujian and Gansu had pure technical inefficiency in the last four years. 
Anhui, Guizhou, and Yunnan were pure technically efficient in four years, but efficiency 
occurred in different years. Moreover, Neimenggu, Hunan, and Sichuan were pure tech- 
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics of sample rural credit cooperatives, 1991–1995 
Variable Minimum Maximum Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Y1-Capital loan to TVEs (¥0,000) 1,331 5,458,025 532,811 791,297 
Y2-Fixed asset loans to 
TVEs(¥0,000) 487 1,108,669 92,277 159,501 
Y3-Agricultural loans (¥0,000) 8,263 1,413,026 298,592 282,542 
Y4-Other loans (¥0,000) 25 2,940,653 239,229 425,192 
Y5-Deposits to other banks (¥0,000) 0 2,097,719 444,987 413,737 
X1-Fixed deposits (¥0,000) 16,268 7,333,675 1,103,862 1,213,853 
X2-Curent deposits (¥0,000) 13,436 4,792,190 504,426 716,655 
X3-Number of employees 1,433 54,900 19,328 13,330 
N-observation number 145    
 
nically inefficient in three years, while Shanxi, Liaoning, and Jilin were pure technically 
inefficient in two years.  
Table 3 shows the results of overall technical efficiency for 29 provinces from 1991 
to 1995. The results listed also include the medians and confidence intervals at a 90 per-
cent confidence level. Hubei and Yunnan were overall technically inefficient while ten 
other provinces or cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Hainan, 
Shaanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang) were overall technically efficient in all five 
years. Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Gansu had overall technical inefficiency in four years. 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and 
Yunnan appeared to be overall technical inefficient in more years than to be pure techni-
cal inefficient. This results from scale inefficiency.  
Table 4 shows the results of scale efficiency measures for 29 provinces from year 
1991 to year 1995. The median and confidence intervals at a 90 percent level are listed. 
Ten provinces or cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Hainan, 
Shaanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang ) were always scale efficient, while Yunnan was
  
TABLE 2. Pure technical efficiency, 1991–1995 
Province/City 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Beijing 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Tianjin 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Hebei 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Shanxi 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9956 (0.9934, 0.9979) 0.9969 (0.9947, 0.9991) 1 (1, 1) 
Neimenggu 1 (1, 1) 0.9995 (0.9975, 1) 0.9875 (0.9852, 0.9898) 0.9904 (0.9881, 0.9927) 0.9967 (0.9943, 0.9988) 
Liaoning 0.9972 (0.9949, 0.9990) 0.9979 (0.9956, 0.9998) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Jilin 0.9994 (0.9976, 1) 0.9999 (0.9979, 1) 0.9910 (0.9888, 0.9933) 0.9967 (0.9943, 0.9988) 1 (1, 1) 
Heilongjiang 0.9990 (0.9969, 1) 1 (0.9999, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Shanghai 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Jiangsu 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Zhejiang 1 (1, 1) 1 (0.9994, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Anhui 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9909 (0.9885, 0.9931) 0.9983 (0.9960, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Fujian 1 (1, 1) 0.9908 (0.9885, 0.9933) 0.9934 (0.9911, 0.9957) 0.9943 (0.9919, 0.9965) 0.9953 (0.9930, 0.9976) 
Jiangxi 0.9922 (0.9901, 0.9947) 0.9904 (0.9881, 0.9928) 0.9897 (0.9875, 0.9921) 0.9938 (0.9914, 0.9963) 1 (0.9997, 1) 
Shandong 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Henan 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9994 (0.9971, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Hubei 0.9938 (0.9914, 0.9962) 0.9854 (0.9830, 0.9879) 0.9889 (0.9866, 0.9912) 0.9944 (0.9922, 0.9966) 1 (1, 1) 
Hunan 0.9923 (0.9901, 0.9947) 0.9911 (0.9887, 0.9932) 0.9952 (0.9931, 0.9976) 0.9985 (0.9961, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Guangdong 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Guangxi 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Hainan 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Sichuan 0.9964 (0.9938, 0.9986) 0.9912 (0.9889, 0.9936) 0.9970 (0.9948, 0.9992) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Guizhou 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9969 (0.9945, 0.9992) 1 (1, 1) 
Yunnan 1 (1, 1) 0.9897 (0.9875, 0.9921) 1 (1, 1) 0.9987 (0.9965, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Shaanxi 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Gansu 1 (1, 1) 0.9963 (0.9941, 0.9984) 0.9852 (0.9828, 0.9874) 0.9881 (0.9858, 0.9904) 0.9925 (0.9902, 0.9951) 
Qinghai 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Ningxia 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Xinjiang 1 (1, 1) 0.9988 (0.9967, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Note: The numbers listed are the median with confidence interval at the 90% level in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3. Overall technical efficiency, 1991–1995 
Province/City 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Beijing 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Tianjin 1 (1, 1) 0.9999 (0.9980, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Hebei 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Shanxi 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9955 (0.9932, 0.9977) 0.9969 (0.9947, 0.9991)   1 (1, 1) 
Neimenggu 1 (1, 1) 0.9992 (0.9971, 1) 0.9873 (0.9850, 0.9896) 0.9903 (0.9880, 0.9926)   0.9964 (0.9940, 0.9986) 
Liaoning 0.9972 (0.9949, 0.9990) 0.9977 (0.9954, 0.9996) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1)                             1 (1, 1) 
Jilin 0.9994 (0.9976, 1) 0.9993 (0.9973, 1) 0.9900 (0.9878, 0.9923) 0.9961 (0.9937, 0.9983)   1 (1, 1) 
Heilongjiang 0.9984 (0.9962, 1) 1 (0.9997, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Shanghai 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Jiangsu 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9993 (0.9984, 0.9998) 1 (1, 1) 
Zhejiang 1 (1, 1) 0.9951 (0.9927, 0.9972 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Anhui 1 (1, 1) 1 (0.9983, 1) 0.9886 (0.9862, 0.9908 0.9923 (0.9901, 0.9947)   0.9968 (0.9945, 0.9988) 
Fujian 1 (1, 1) 0.9908 (0.9885, 0.9932 0.9932 (0.9909, 0.9955) 0.9939 (0.9915, 0.9961)   0.9948 (0.9925, 0.9971) 
Jiangxi 0.9921 (0.9900, 0.9946) 0.9901 (0.9878, 0.9924) 0.9895 (0.9873, 0.9919) 0.9933 (0.9909, 0.9958)   0.9982 (0.9961, 1) 
Shandong 0.9982 (0.9961, 0.9999) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9978 (0.9955, 0.9997)   1 (1, 1) 
Henan 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9975 (0.9952, 0.9994) 1 (1, 1) 
Hubei 0.9930 (0.9907, 0.9955) 0.9851 (0.9827, 0.9876) 0.9889 (0.9866, 0.9912) 0.9926 (0.9904, 0.9949)   0.9990 (0.9970, 0.9990) 
Hunan 0.9892 (0.9869, 0.9916) 0.9862 (0.9839, 0.9883) 0.9927 (0.9906, 0.9951) 0.9958 (0.9934, 0.9980)   1 (1, 1) 
Guangdong 0.9959 (0.9936, 0.9981) 1 (1,1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1)                              1 (1, 1) 
Guangxi 0.9866 (0.9843, 0.9888) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Hainan 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Sichuan 0.9901 (0.9877, 0.9924) 0.9862 (0.9840, 0.9882) 0.9966 (0.9944, 0.9988) 1 (1,1)                               1 (1, 1) 
Guizhou 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9946 (0.9922, 0.9969) 1 (1, 1) 
Yunnan 0.9990 (0.9977, 0.9993) 0.9880 (0.9858, 0.9904) 0.9918 (0.9893, 0.9941) 0.9878 (0.9856, 0.9902)   0.9901 (0.9878, 0.9924) 
Shaanxi 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Gansu 1 (1, 1) 0.9961 (0.9939, 0.9983 0.9851 (0.9828, 0.9874) 0.9881 (0.9858, 0.9903)   0.9920(0.9896, 0.9945) 
Qinghai 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9995 (0.9974, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Ningxia 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Xinjiang 1 (1, 1) 0.9985 (0.9965, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Note: The numbers listed are the median with confidence interval at the 90% level in parentheses. 
Technical and Scale Efficiencies for Chinese Rural Credit Cooperatives / 17
  
TABLE 4. Scale efficiency, 1991–1995 
Province/City 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Beijing 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Tianjin 1 (1, 1) 0.9999 (0.9980,1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Hebei 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Shanxi 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999) 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999) 1 (1, 1) 
Neimenggu 1 (1, 1) 0.9996 (0.9996, 1) 0.9998 (0.9998, 0.9998) 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999)      0.9997 (0.9997, 0.9997) 
Liaoning 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999) 0.9998 (0.9998, 0.9998) 1 (1,1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Jilin 0.9999 (0.9999, 1) 0.9994 (0.9994, 1) 0.9990 (0.9990, 0.9990) 0.9995 (0.9995, 0.9995)      1 (1, 1) 
Heilongjiang 0.9994 (0.9994, 1) 1 (0.9998, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Shanghai 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Jiangsu 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9993 (0.9984, 0.9998) 1 (1, 1) 
Zhejiang 1 (1, 1) 0.9951 (0.9933, 0.9972) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Anhui 1 (1, 1) 1 (0.9983, 1) 0.9977 (0.9977, 0.9977) 0.9941 (0.9941, 0.9947) 0.9968 (0.9945, 0.9980) 
Fujian 1 (1, 1) 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999) 0.9998 (0.9998, 0.9998) 0.9997 (0.9997, 0.9997)      0.9995 (0.9995, 0.9995) 
Jiangxi 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999) 0.9996 (0.9996, 0.9996) 0.9998 (0.9998, 0.9998) 0.9995 (0.9995,0.9995)       0.9982 (0.9964, 1) 
Shandong 0.9982 (0.9961, 0.9999) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9978 (0.9955, 0.9997) 1 (1, 1) 
Henan 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9981 (0.9981, 0.9994) 1 (1, 1) 
Hubei 0.9992 (0.9992, 0.9992) 0.9997 (0.9997, 0.9997) 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999) 0.9983 (0.9983, 0.9983)      0.9990 (0.9970, 1) 
Hunan 0.9968 (0.9968, 0.9968) 0.9951 (0.9951, 0.9951) 0.9975 (0.9975, 0.9975) 0.9973 (0.9973, 0.9980)     1 (1, 1) 
Guangdong 0.9959 (0.9936, 0.9981) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Guangxi 0.9866 (0.9843, 0.9888) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Hainan 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Sichuan 0.9938 (0.9938, 0.9938) 0.9949 (0.9946, 0.9950) 0.9996 (0.9996, 0.9996) 1 (1, 1 1 (1, 1) 
Guizhou 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9977 (0.9977, 0.9977) 1 (1, 1) 
Yunnan 0.9990 (0.9977, 0.9993) 0.9983 (0.9983, 0.9983) 0.9918 (0.9893, 0.9941) 0.9891 (0.9891, 0.9902)      0.9901 (0.9878, 0.9924) 
Shaanxi 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
Gansu 1 (1, 1) 0.9998 (0.9998, 0.9998) 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999) 0.9999 (0.9999, 0.9999)      0.9995 (0.9995, 0.9995) 
Qinghai 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 0.9995 (0.9974, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1,1) 
Ningxia 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1,1) 
Xinjiang            1 (1, 1)    0.9998 (0.9998, 1)      1 (1, 1)   1 (1, 1)   1 (1, 1) 
Note: The numbers listed are the median with confidence interval at the 90% level in parentheses. 
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always scale inefficient. Fujian and Gansu were scale inefficient in the last four years 
while Hubei and Hunan were scale inefficient in the first four years. Neimenggu and  
Anhui provinces were scale inefficient in the last three years while Sichuan province was 
scale inefficient in the first three years. Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
and Guizhou provinces were scale inefficient in only one year.  
The scale inefficiency is the result of operating at either increasing or decreasing re-
turns to scale. To determine the type of returns to scale, ii γλ ˆ and ˆ  were compared. With 
1,000 bootstrap results for each scale inefficiency, if 95 percent or 950 of 1,000 
ii γλ ˆ and ˆ are equal, then decreasing returns to scale exist; if 95 percent or 950 of 1,000 
ii γλ ˆ and ˆ are unequal, then increasing returns to scale exist. Table 5 lists the types of re-
turns to scale for the provinces and cities. Yunnan always had decreasing returns to scale. 
Hunan had decreasing returns to scale in the first four years and constant returns to scale 
in the last year while Guangdong, and Guangxi had decreasing returns to scale in the first 
year and constant returns to scale in the last four years. Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Henan also 
had decreasing returns to scale in one year and constant returns to scale in four years but 
this occurred in different years. Decreasing returns to scale existed in the first three years 
for Sichuan province and in the last three years for Anhui province. Neimenggu had in-
creasing returns to scale in the last three years. The type of returns to scale for some 
scale-inefficient provinces varied greatly over time. For example, Jiangxi changed from 
increasing returns to scale in the first three years to decreasing returns to scale in the 
fourth year and then to constant returns to scale in the last year; and Fujian changed from 
constant returns to scale in the first year to decreasing returns to scale in the second year 
and then to increasing returns to scale in the last three years.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we employed a bootstrap procedure that allows testing of statistical in-
ference of nonparametric scale efficiency measures as well as pure and overall technical 
efficiency for China’s RCCs in individual provinces in different years. This study not 
only fills the gap in academic research on efficiencies of China’s RCCs but also provides 
insight into guidelines for the current effort to reform and restructure RCCs in China and
  
TABLE 5. Returns to scale, 1991–1995 
Province 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Beijing C C C C C 
Tianjin C C C C C 
Hebei C C C C C 
Shanxi C C I D C 
Neimenggu C C I I I 
Liaoning D I C C C 
Jilin C C I I C 
Heilongjiang C C C C C 
Shanghai C C C C C 
Jiangsu C C C D C 
Zhejiang C D C C C 
Anhui C C D D D 
Fujian C D I I I 
Jiangxi I I I D C 
Shandong D C C D C 
Henan C C C D C 
Hubei D I I D C 
Hunan D D D D C 
Guangdong D C C C C 
Guangxi D C C C C 
Hainan C C C C C 
Sichuan D D D C C 
Guizhou C C C I C 
Yunnan D D D D D 
Shaanxi C C C C C 
Gansu C I D I I 
Qinghai C C C C C 
Ningxia C C C C C 
Xinjiang C C C C C 
Note: C: constant returns to scale; I: increasing returns to scale; D: decreasing returns to scale. 
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for future reform in a wider range. Moreover, because the application of the bootstrap to 
the DEA method is still under development and previous studies are few and recent, this 
study offers a fresh application of bootstrapping to the DEA method. 
The empirical results present important evidence on efficiency in China’s RCCs. As 
the experimental reforms are currently being undertaken in eight provinces and cities, the 
evidence presented could prove extremely useful. The estimated efficiency results are 
close to one and to each other, which indicates that RCCs in each province are mandated 
to take the same technology and practices and engage in similar scales of production. 
Among the eight experimental provinces or cities, our evidence points to a need for 
RCCs in Jiangxi province to put more effort into adopting the best practices existing in 
RCCs to improve their pure technical efficiency, adjusting their scales of loan services to 
obtain scale efficiency, and, finally, increasing the overall efficiency of the agricultural 
lending system. Jilin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Guizhou provinces also need to 
focus on adopting best practices or adjusting their scales of loans in order to obtain over-
all technical efficiency. Shaanxi is the only province of the eight experimental provinces 
and cities that has both technical efficiency and scale efficiency. However, since the 
measurement is a relative comparison, it does not mean that RCCs in Shaanxi province 
have adopted the best practices for financial services outside of RCCs. A next step would 
be to compare the RCCs with more modern financial services like those in developed 
countries to possibly improve efficiency.  
RCCs, as a micro-foundation of the financial sector, are greatly influenced by the 
macro-environment set by the government and society. However, in this empirical study, 
we are concerned only with the internal structure of the RCCs and do not consider the 
issues of government, financial systems, and other macro issues. Reform of RCCs is quite 
complicated. It depends not only on self-improvement of RCCs but also involves gov-
ernment policy on reform of their managerial system, their form of ownership, and 
dealing with past nonperforming loans. In addition, reform cannot come without the gov-
ernment taking steps toward financial market liberalization. Finally, in this study we did 
not consider the interaction between the non-performing loans and cost efficiency (Ber-
ger and DeYoung 1987) because of unavailable data on non-performing loans for each 
province, which could result in an overestimate of cost efficiency.  
  
 
Endnotes 
1. The four state banks have percentages of nonperforming loans between 25 and 40 percent 
(Pener 2001).  
2. After the RCCs’ separation from the Agricultural Bank of China in 1996, data on the 
RCCs are not available in the China Rural Finance Almanac. Given the fact that RCCs 
have not changed significantly after the separation, the data ranging in this period are still 
representative.  
3.  For Heilongjiang in 1991 and 1992, Zhejiang and Xinjiang in 1992, and Henan in 1994, 
since the 900th of their sorted pure technical efficiency measures is one, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that their pure technical efficiency measures are one relative to the 
alternative hypothesis that their pure technical efficiency measures are less than one at 
the 90 percent confidence level. Therefore, we conclude that these provinces were pure 
technically efficient. We make a similar conclusion for other intervals containing one.  
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